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Electoral integrity is an essential element for ending Afghanistan’s culture of impunity and 
promoting legitimate governance. Over the last decade, elections in Afghanistan have been marred 
by corruption that has undermined the government’s legitimacy and effectiveness. Against this 
bleak backdrop, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, controversial head of the Independent Election 
Commission (IEC),  stepped down on March 26, providing hope for cleaner governance. Yet, the 
deeper structural challenges that produced the electoral crises of 2009, 2010, and 2014, remain. 
With parliamentary and district council elections slated for October 15 of this year, Afghanistan’s 
political leadership must fix a clearly broken election process. 
Installed at former President Hamid Karzai’s behest in 2013, Nuristani had overseen the deeply 
flawed presidential election in 2014. He also led the charge to systematically dismantle 
rudimentary integrity mechanisms which had uncovered serious irregularities during the 2009 
presidential election. That facilitated even greater political interference in the 2014 presidential 
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polls. This situation was only resolved through extra-constitutional means. In the end, the process 
was so broken and the results so flawed that an agreement was brokered by the United States to 
break the deadlock whereby Ghani was declared the winner of the presidency, but no final vote 
count was ever released. Abdullah Abdullah was named Chief Executive Officer, a post that did 
not previously exist and lacked a clear mandate. Part of the agreement to secure Abdullah’s 
acquiescence in a unity government was a promise to overhaul the electoral system. 
Yet, the road to electoral reform has been rocky. After extensive delay, the Special Electoral 
Reform Commission (SERC) commenced in June 2015; only to be quickly consumed by internal 
disagreements. A majority endorsed some reforms later that year most notably establishing 
a Selection Committee to determine membership to the IEC and the Independent Election 
Complaints Commission (IECC). More important, it proposed a new electoral system. Afghanistan 
parliamentary elections had used a single, non-transferable vote (SNTV) system since 2005. Under 
SNTV, parliamentary districts have multiple seats and the top vote recipients in each district 
receive seats. Each province has their total number of representatives allocated by population, with 
a total of 249 seats nationwide. The results tend to be chaotic, complex and ultimately not 
representative. Ballots are unwieldly and small vote differentials can produce widely varying 
results. Moreover, this system discourages political party development by rewarding individual 
notoriety and hindering collective action. That in turn leaves parties weak in the sense that they 
cannot aggregate social interests or offer coherent platforms. The SERC majority advocated for a 
system that allocated one-third of the seats through proportional representation with single voters’ 
districts, coupled with a quota system, but it was not clear whether this would simplify or, more 
likely, further complicate the procedures. 
These plans were abruptly quashed last December when parliament’s lower house (Wolesi Jirga) 
rejected the reforms. In response, Ghani issued a new presidential decree law on March 5. While 
the SERC’s reforms had been criticized as insufficient, the new reforms were even more modest. 
They focused on relatively minor technical adjustments to the IECC and IEC and they fall far short 
of major structural changes needed to get Afghanistan’s deeply flawed democratic processes back 
on track. 
Without doubt, Nuristani embodied what was wrong with the Afghan election process. It is 
essential that the new head of the IEC is someone whom all ethnic and political constituencies 
respect as fair and impartial. But a new IEC chair will not be sufficient. Meaningful election 
reform, overseen by a truly independent IEC and backed by a vigorous, impartial IECC remains 
vital. Ideally, these procedural changes would be coupled with an electoral system that more 
faithfully translates popular preferences into electoral results. The use of closed-list proportional 
representation, for instance, could bolster the viability of political parties substantially, and more 
accurately reflect voter preferences. 
International actors can also play a constructive role. They should stand firm in demanding serious 
reform before underwriting the expenses of another parliamentary poll. The first formal step 
towards democracy in Afghanistan actually started with the registration of voters for elections in 
mid-2004 by the United Nations. In this context, an interim Joint Electoral Management Body was 
created, with both Afghan and international members, that was later replaced by the IEC. The 
presence of international membership on the IEC and IECC should help prevent abuses and 
address claims of electoral malfeasance swiftly, fairly, and effectively. 
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Afghanistan continues to face daunting political and economic issues, as well as a growing Taliban 
insurgency which openly challenges the state’s authority. A sensible electoral system, combined 
with a well-constructed law on political parties, and well-executed credible elections could help 
jumpstart Afghanistan’s flagging democracy and produce legitimate political leadership to start 
addressing those challenges. 
 
